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Introduction
There is one aspect of globalization over which its advocates and critics agree:
the increasingly important role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the global economy. The latter group criticizes the expanding market and political power of MNEs while the former is convinced of their contribution to growth and development. The organizational structure of MNEs can be a signi…cant factor in determining whether they simply exploit their market power or truly contribute to the development of the host country. Foreign investment by MNEs can take several forms: one option is to directly set up a wholly owned subsidiary in order to have more control over and closer monitoring of its operations abroad;
another is to enter an agreement such as licensing, acquisition, or a joint venture (JV) with an already existing foreign …rm to serve a foreign market. The question comes to mind as to which form of investment MNEs prefer under di¤erent circumstances and whether their preferred market structure can be an equilibrium outcome. 1 Firm-speci…c assets may be knowledge based and can be protected by a patent. The patent grants the MNE technological superiority, which creates 1 Dunning (1981) studied di¤erent modes of entry by considering three advantages of investing into a foreign market. This is usually referred to as the OLI framework, which stands for ownership, locational and internalization advantage. The ownership advantage occurs as information (technology) can be transferred over border at low cost and can therefore be used in several facilities at no extra costs. Locational advantage comes from motives such as tari¤s, transport costs, market size, lower wages and closeness to customers. Internalization advantage involves keeping crucial technology in-house by choosing FDI over licensing or JVs.
2 incentives for it to move to a foreign market. When an enforcement mechanism to protect patents is absent in the target country, the …rm's desire to protect its knowledge based assets can in ‡uence how (if at all) it chooses to enter that foreign market. The IPR regime in the host country is hence likely to have an e¤ect on this decision. If knowledge is valuable but can be copied, a MNE may not wish to reveal its technology to an unrelated Southern …rm as it would lose absolute control over its know-how. This leads …rms to seek a safer alternative and engage in green…eld foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries with weaker IPRs and contract enforcement mechanisms (Maskus, 1998) . Subsequently, as IPR protection in a nation becomes stronger, i.e. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is enforced, …rms would not need to rely as much on the direct form of FDI and tend to choose more licensing and JV agreements.
The relative R&D intensity of an industry also plays an important role in the decision of …rms on how to enter a foreign market. For instance in low tech goods such as textile and apparel, distribution, hotel, etc. FDI depends relatively little on IPRs and more on input costs and market opportunities. Investments with technologies that are too costly to imitate likewise pay little attention to local IPR levels. 2 It is particularly in industries with valuable, but easily copied technologies such as the pharmaceutical, chemical or the software industry where concern over the ability of local IPRs to deter imitation arises when making foreign investment decisions. Mans…eld's (1994) survey of intellectual property executives in one hundred major US …rms in six industries that had international operations found that JVs or licensing to unrelated …rms is seen as riskier than FDI with a wholly owned subsidiary when IPRs are weak. This concern was higher for more R&D intensive sectors. 3 This is because the risk at stake is much higher when technologies require higher amounts of R&D investment, making it more e¢ cient to avoid potential losses by internalizing technology transfer through FDI. As the IPR regime in a developing country improves, i.e.
it adopts TRIPS, we expect to see licensing and JVs displace FDI.
As technology transfer has proved to be necessary means of growth, it also has important welfare implications for developing countries that attempt to attract foreign capital. The illegitimate means of technology transfer can be achieved through imitation when MNEs choose the form of entry that is relatively more vulnerable to spillovers. However, it is less likely that a MNE makes such a choice when the IPR regime in the target country is loose. The legitimate (voluntary) form of technology transfer on the other hand can be processed through licensing or JV agreements. This form of transfer only occurs when …rms see enough commitment to IPRs in the host country so that excessive leakage of its know-how outside the JV can be prevented. It will be seen that this form of technology transfer can be accelerated by an improvement in the level of IPR protection in the South. Hence the South can induce the Northern …rm to undertake voluntary technology transfer when it sees JVs as the socially 3 The concern was also higher for all sectors when a higher stage of production was under question.
4 preferable form of inward investment. In fact, the TRIPS agreement includes provision such as the article 66.2 that requires Northern governments to provide incentives for their …rms to transfer technology to the South in return for the protection of their IPRs. 4 As there has been few signs of such move by the North, governments in the South demand that this requirement is made more e¤ective and have sought a mechanism for ensuring this in the Doha round.
Policies that limit direct foreign investment in the South have been used as an indirect way to encourage inward technology transfer. Indeed, foreign investment policies that place limits on the direct form of FDI, or on the degree of foreign ownership in a JV are often observed in developing countries.
Limitations on foreign investment still persist to a great extent in non-WTO members such as Iran. They can even be observed in several member countries such as China, which after joining the WTO has only raised its limits on foreign ownership of JVs in the telecommunications industry to 49% and in insurance and automobile industries to 50% . (Lin and Saggi, 2004) . This motivates an investigation to see whether such policies are optimal for the South and if so how they could bene…t the latter when technology transfer is taken into account.
The role of JVs have been surprisingly little explored in the IPR literature.
Al-Saadon and Das (1996) for instance constructs a model of JVs in which ownership shares are endogenously determined through bargaining between a MNE and a single host …rm. Only another handful of papers such as Das (1999) and Lin and Saggi (2004) 
where A represents the size of the integrated world market and Q is the total quantity produced.
It is assumed that the Northern MNE has already decided to establish production in the South with cross-border trade being infeasible or too costly. 8 The MNE must make a decision whether to enter the South through FDI or a JV agreement. It could establish a wholly owned subsidiary to protect its technology from exposure to Southern …rms. In this case the MNE remains the only …rm that has access to the superior technology generated by its R&D. Alternatively, it could form a JV agreement with an already existing Southern …rm. 9 In this case, a potentially loose IPR policy in the South makes it possible for 7 The literature in oligopoly in general equilibrium is very small but growing. See for instance Neary (2003) for recent work on "general oligopolistic equilibrium". In this and in related papers Neary treats …rms as large in their own sectors yet small in the economy as a whole. 8 The trade-o¤ between exporting and FDI in the context of IPRs has been explored in previous literature (see for example Naghavi, 2005) and is not the aim of this paper. 9 We rule out the possibility of the Northern …rm entering a JV with more than one …rm.
We consider that to be a less realistic case. with di¤erent R&D intensities. The paper however leaves out extremely high technology intensive industries discussed in a somewhat similar framework in Chin and Grossman (1991) and Zigic (1998) where the Northern …rm may be able to form a constrained or unconstrained monopoly. 11 Such industries are not of interest in our discussion on JVs as they are infeasible and lie beyond the region where sharing ownership is a pro…table option for the MNE. 12 The cost functions for the Northern and the Southern …rms respectively are
and
where x 2 =g. x is the R&D investment, g is the e¤ectiveness of R&D, is the pre-innovative production cost, and Absorptive capacity b is the ease with which the outsider Southern …rm can absorb the knowledge generated by the JV. This will depend on such factors as the complexity of the knowledge generated an the level of development of the Southern …rm and country. The larger is b, the greater is the absorptive capacity. Thus when b = 0 it is impossible for the outsider Southern …rm to learn anything from the JV while when b = 1 the …rm is fully capable of making use of the available technology. When IPR protection is completely missing in the host country, spillovers amount to the natural level determined by how easy it is to copy the technology ( = b). In the rest of the paper, we focus the discussion on changes in the level of IPR protection and take b as given. Note that the former is a policy instrument whereas b is exogenous. Finally, = 0 always holds under FDI as it is assumed that this form of subsidiary prevents any leakage/spillover of knowledge to competing …rms operating in the South. 13 We also compare the welfare implications of each mode of entry to …nd the socially optimal form of foreign investment for the host country. This allows us to see whether it is optimal for the South to upgrade its IPR protection regime and/or put restrictions on foreign ownership in a JV.
The timing of the game is as follows. Firms bargain in the …rst stage over their share in a potential JV, which in turn determines the market structure. If both …rms are at least as well o¤ with the bargaining outcome than competing on their own, the bargain is a success and the JV goes through. Otherwise the MNE enters the South through FDI. The MNE then engages in R&D and …rms compete in output in the …nal stage of the game. We now turn to the two modes of entry and look at production and R&D investment for each case before analyzing the bargaining game in the …rst stage.
FDI
When the Northern …rm chooses to enter the South through FDI, it simply competes with active local …rms in the host country that produce the homogeneous good. It is usually assumed that FDI incurs …xed costs that can be avoided by forming cross-border JVs to utilize already existing facilities of a foreign …rm. 
where subscript F represents the Northern …rm when it engages in FDI, S denotes a Southern …rm and j = 1; 2 identi…es the latter. In the …nal stage of the game, …rms compete in quantity and …nd their optimal output using the …rst order conditions of (5) and (6) with respect to q:
q Sj = a p gx
for j = 1; 2. As A appears in all the upcoming equations, it is replaced by a to simplify the notation. Replacing the optimal quantities back into the Northern …rm's pro…t function and di¤erentiating the latter with respect to x, we can derive the optimal level of R&D investment:
It can be seen that R&D e¤ort is higher the more technology intensive is an industry (i.e. the higher is g). Finally replacing the optimal output and R&D investment back into (5) and (6), the optimal pro…ts for each …rm can be found:
We assume that g 4=3 to assure that all …rms produce non-negative output and earn non-negative pro…ts. A higher level of g would lead to the Southern …rms being driven out of the market. In that case, neither Southern …rm …nds it pro…table to enter the market and compete in technology intensive industries.
We rule out this case.
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Joint Venture
Now assume the Northern …rm enters the South by forming a JV with a local …rm in the host country. 15 We assume a JV maximizes joint pro…ts with a …xed share of pro…ts going to each partner. The joint pro…ts of the Northern …rm and the Southern …rm in a JV are
with subscript J representing a JV. Note that the MNE in this case gets the Southern partner to share its R&D costs. An agreed share of pro…ts (1 ) goes to the Northern (Southern) partner where 0 1. All production by the JV is assumed to take place in the South. It is in the interests of both …rms in a JV to have full information sharing with respect to the results of the R&D undertaken as full 'internal spillover'is needed to maximize joint pro…ts. Thus all output in the JV is produced at a marginal cost of C. The outsider …rm in the South can gain partial access to the technology developed by the JV. How great a spillover it enjoys depends on the absorptive capacity and the weakness of IPR protection in the South, . The pro…t of the outsider Southern …rm is
where the second subscript O stands for outsider. Solving for the optimal output by each …rm yields
for the JV and the outsider Southern …rm respectively.
Subsequently, optimal R&D investment by the JV is
Comparing (9) and (16), it can be seen that the equilibrium R&D is higher under FDI than under a JV as long as R&D e¤ectiveness is above the threshold
This value starts at 5=6 for full protection ( = 0) and is falling in until it reaches 0 when = 5=16. 16 Looser IPR protection reduces R&D incentives of a JV due to higher spillovers, while not a¤ecting that in the case of FDI. Notice that the R&D decision is independent of how pro…ts are divided between the two partners in a JV as joint pro…ts are maximized when solving for the optimal R&D investment.
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Substituting the optimal levels of output and R&D investment back into the pro…t function of each …rm, optimal pro…ts turn out to be
for the JV and the outsider Southern …rm respectively. The pro…t of the JV is always decreasing in spillovers, whereas that of the outsider Southern …rm is always increasing with it. The advantage of the JV over a third …rm decreases with a weaker IPR regime as the cost asummerty that exists between the JV and the outsider …rm is reduced.
Bargaining in the Joint Venture
Turning now to the bargaining between the two …rms in the …rst stage of the game, a deal has to be reached in order to divide the joint pro…ts in (18) We look at the two extreme cases where either the Northern or the Southern …rm holds full bargaining power. When a …rm has all the bargaining power, it captures all rents from the JV and leaves its partner the minimum share that is just su¢ cient to convince the latter to participate.
When it is the Southern …rm that has all the bargaining power, the MNE's pro…ts are equal in the JV and FDI cases. Formally, the critical share is the which solves F = J :
The superscript indicates which side of the deal enjoys the bargaining power.
The share that the Northern …rm keeps starts at 9=16 when g = 0 and is increasing in g until it reaches 1, that is when the Northern …rm no longer …nds it optimal to create a JV and share its technology. Meanwhile, the Southern …rm would only enter a JV if the share (1 S ) matches its pro…ts in the FDI case, where it uses its old technology to compete with the Northern …rm. A JV not being possible when g is above a critical threshold complies with empirical …ndings of Smarzynska Javorcik (2000) and Saggi and Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) , which show that JVs in highly R&D intensive sectors present a lower potential for transfer of technology as Northern …rms would be more likely to engage in wholly owned projects than to share ownership.
We turn now to the case in which the Northern …rm has all the bargaining power. It o¤ers a share to the Southern …rm that would make the latter indifferent between the JV and FDI. The share that is retained by the Northern …rm is denoted by N and is the that solves Sj = (1 ) J :
The pro…ts of the Northern …rm when it has full bargaining power in a JV bargaining power is also increasing in g, but is now concave and is higher than S in the relevant range. Figure 1 illustrates the share of pro…ts that remains for the MNE in each case, namely S and N , for a situation when IPRs are fully protected.
The Equilibrium Mode of Entry
Based on the outcome of the bargaining process, the Northern …rm makes a decision on how to enter the Southern market. If a JV is to generate additional pro…ts for insiders then J F + Sj . Also, recall that S = Sj = J and 1 N = F = J . Substituting these in the above inequality gives 1 (1
if a JV is to take place. Note that N is below S at low g. A JV is not an equilibrium here because at low g total JV pro…ts are smaller than the sum of pro…ts of the two participants in the absence of a JV, i.e. J < F + Sj . As J initially rises faster in g than F + Sj , the share o¤ered by the Northern …rm when it has full bargaining also increases faster than its share when the Southern partner has full bargaining power until N = S . At this point, the maximum share that a …rm can get in a JV is also the minimum share that it will accept, hence there are no rents from forming a JV that could be shared out among participants. After this threshold level of g, N > S and JV brings extra rents until S > N again after a critical level of g (for positive ).
Proposition 1 JV is the equilibrium market structure when N S so that the maximum potential Northern share when a JV is formed exceeds the minimum share it requires to form a JV. This condition assures that extra rents can be gained from a JV.
Looking back at …gure 1, when the Southern …rm has the bargaining power, looser IPR protection in the South leads to S reaching unity at a lower level of g because the relative pro…tability of the JV falls. The MNE instead chooses to protect itself from exposure to Southern …rms by establishing its own subsidiary abroad. When the Northern …rm has the bargaining power on the other hand, looser IPR protection lowers the share it keeps as JV pro…ts are lower and a more generous o¤er must be made to persuade the Southern …rm to enter a JV.
As increases, the S curve shifts to the left, while N slightly shifts down.
Consequently, the …rst intersection between the S and N curves moves to the right and a second intersection eventually occurs and moves to the left, thus reducing the range of g over which a JV occurs. Finally, a level of is reached at which the N curve lies below the S curve everywhere, implying that a JV is no longer viable at any g.
There is a threshold level of above which a JV is no longer pro…table and hence cannot be an equilibrium. A JV will be formed below this threshold regardless of who holds the bargaining power. This critical level of spillovers can be derived by solving for the at which J = F + Sj :
At~ there are just zero gains from a JV. The Southern …rm is just indi¤erent between staying out of a JV and getting the maximum possible JV share consistent with the Northern …rm taking part, (1 S ). Likewise, the Northern …rm is just as well o¤ without a JV as forming one and getting the maximum share N . This implies that the equilibrium form of foreign investment is the same regardless of which side holds the bargaining power as~ is identical for both cases.
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Lemma 1 The critical level of spillovers~ under which a JV is the equilibrium market structure is the same regardless of which side of the JV holds the bargaining power as N = S always holds at~ .
Recall that this threshold determines whether a JV creates additional total pro…ts for the insiders than when they remain on their own ( J F + Sj ). 
Southern Welfare
In this section we examine some policies that could be used by the Southern government to raise welfare. Southern welfare consists of consumer surplus and the pro…ts of the two Southern …rms. The welfare function can be written as
where the second subscripts I and O stand for insider and outsider, and superscripts F and J denote FDI and JV. Initially, we assume that all output is sold on the Southern market and Southern consumer surplus is:
Solving for consumer surplus under each mode of entry, we obtain
for FDI and JV respectively.
The other constituent of welfare is producer surplus which itself consists of the pro…ts of the outsider and the insider Southern …rms. The pro…ts of the outsider …rm not considered for the JV can be seen in equations (11) and (19) for FDI and JV respectively. The pro…t of the Southern …rm potentially involved in the JV is given in (11) if the MNE chooses FDI, and is (1 S ) J or (1 N ) J in a JV depending on which side holds the bargaining power.
Notice that if it is the Northern …rm who has the bargaining power, the insider …rm's pro…t can be dropped from the welfare comparison as it is equal to FDI pro…ts by the de…nition of N . 19 When the Southern …rm holds the bargaining power on the other hand, its pro…ts are
We now turn to the IPR and the foreign investment policies in the South and discuss how they can be optimally set to maximize Southern welfare.
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights
We …rst analyze the relationship between the level of IPR protection in the South and each component of welfare individually. As no spillovers are assumed under FDI, changing only a¤ects welfare when JV is the market outcome.
The impact of on consumer surplus can be found by looking at changes in equation (28). increases consumer surplus until it reaches a peak, after which the detrimental e¤ect of higher spillovers from lower incentives to innovate dominates and starts to harm consumers in the economy. For high levels of g where R&D is more intensive, consumer surplus is always falling with a higher . Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to gives the optimal level of spillovers from the consumers'perspective:
The that maximizes consumer surplus approaches 1=2 as g tends to zero and falls in g until it reachs zero at g = 3=4. For higher g's where R&D takes a meaningful role in the industry, consumers prefer full IPR protection ( = 0)
to enjoy higher levels of innovation.
Next we turn to the e¤ect of on the pro…ts of the two Southern …rms.
Equation (19) shows that the pro…ts of the outsider …rm is always increasing in due to the bene…ts brought about by technological spillovers. Equation (29) shows that the pro…ts of the insider …rm is always decreasing in when it has the bargaining power in the JV and is independent of when the MNE has the bargaining power. 20 Total Southern pro…ts therefore also increases in when the MNE has the bargaining power. On the other hand, when the Southern …rm holds the bargaining power it increases with at low levels of g, where the gains of the outsider from spillovers dominates the losses it brings to the insider.
Total pro…ts are decreasing in at high g's where the reverse is true.
We can now add up to derive the impact of on total Southern welfare.
When the Northern …rm has the bargaining power,
> 0 implies that a higher level of spillovers always increases Southern welfare in the feasible range of g where JV is a possible outcome. While a higher always increases total producer surplus, it also improves consumer surplus up to the point where~ and^ intersect (g 1=2) and reduces it thereafter.
The impact of on welfare when the Southern …rm posesses the bargaining power depends on g, the R&D intensity of the industry. When g is low both consumer surplus and producer surplus are increasing in , while the opposite holds at high levels of g. Welfare therefore increases in for low g, decreases in for high g, and is locally U-shaped around the critical value of g = 1 with local maxima at = 0 and = 1. The e¤ect of spillovers is hence ambiguous on total welfare (
. It is however possible to draw from the shape of W J ( S ) that maximum welfare is reached at either the highest spillover rate in concurrence with a JV,~ , or at zero spillovers.
When the MNE has full bargaining power so that always increases welfare, the optimal policy is the that gives~ . To achieve this outcome, IPR protection needs to be stronger the easier it is to copy the technology of the MNE. When the Southern …rm has the bargaining power, the optimal policy should give~ for g g, but is = = 0 for g > g. Recall that at high g's total Southern welfare is at its maximum level with = 0 as losses from lower incentives to innovate accompanied by higher spillovers are substantial.
Proposition 3 If a host country prefers a JV as the mode of inward investment, then subject to the JV constraint ( ~ ) the optimal IPR policy should give~ for g g, and for g > g when the MNE holds the bargaining power.
When production is su¢ ciently R&D intensive (g > g) and the Southern …rm holds the JV bargaining power, it is in the interest of the South to fully protect IPRs ( = 0).
After assessing how a¤ects Southern welfare in the presence of a JV, we turn to the comparison of welfare under the two market structures (with and without a JV). The South is able to manipulate the decision of the MNE on the mode of entry by choosing an IPR regime that assures the preferred form of inward investment.
Comparing (27) and (28) reveals that consumer surplus with FDI is higher than that under a JV. This is because the JV results in less competition and thus a higher price. Comparing the pro…ts of the outsider …rm under the two modes using (11) and (29), it is easy to see that it is always higher when a JV is formed. This gain comes from two sources: lower competition and spillovers.
As for the insider …rm, we have seen in the previous sections that its JV pro…ts only di¤er from that under FDI when it holds the bargaining power. When IPRs are fully protected ( = 0), the …rms prefer a JV except for low levels of R&D intensity. When IPRs are less well protected on the other hand ( > 0), the relative attractiveness of FDI increases.
Finally, adding up pro…ts of the two Southern …rms for each case reveals that total Southern pro…ts are always higher with a JV than with FDI, i.e. 
Intellectual Property Rights and the FDI Policy
Having calculated all the components of welfare, we can now analyze the optimal mode of inward investment from the point of view of the South and with it the implications for Southern investment policies that limit foreign share in a JV. We will now compare Southern welfare under FDI with the best attainable welfare under a JV. As we saw earlier, the latter reaches a constrained maximum at = 0 or =~ depending on the level of g. Recall also that the parity N = S holds when spillovers are at the threshold level~ , making the profits of the insider Southern …rm equal under both bargaining power situations.
Furthermore, consumer surplus and pro…ts of the outsider …rm are independent of the internal division of pro…ts in a JV. Thus, at =~ , total welfare under a JV is independent of bargaining power.
Lemma 2 Southern welfare under a JV at~ is equal regardless of whether the Northern or the Southern …rm holds the bargaining power. The second region lies within the range g0 g g 00 , where =~ is optimal and a JV is preferred to FDI regardless of who in the JV holds the bargaining power (see lemma 2). 21 Thus, at~ , policies aimed at increasing the Southern share in the JV do not a¤ect welfare of recipient countries.
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Proposition 4 For a large mid-range of g0 g g 00 , it is optimal for the South to strengthen its IPR regime to the level that induces a JV (~ ). Foreign investment policies on the other hand prove irrelevant as welfare under~ is independent of the JV shares and thus the bargaining power in the JV (lemma 2).
For g > g 00 , strengthening IPRs to the level that eliminates spillovers altogether extends the desirability of a JV up toĝ when the Southern …rm holds the bargaining power. Recall that the interests of …rms also moves in this direction as a JV is the equilibrium outcome for a larger range of g when a more stringent IPR regime is enforced. Hence, a dual IPR/FDI policy increases the likelihood that a JV is formed and results in higher welfare when g > g. 23 The small arrow 2 1 Also these results are parallel to Smarzynska Javorcik (2000) and Saggi and Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) in which the South tends to favor JVs over other forms of FDI believing that local participation made possible by the former is a better way to facilitate absorption of new technologies. 2 2 These results are in accordance with those in Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004) Proposition 5 At higher levels of R&D e¤ ectiveness ( g < g ĝ), the South can attain maximum welfare through a dual policy that limits foreign shares in a JV and fully protects IPRs.
In the third region, where R&D intensity is at its highest level (g >ĝ), the Southern government prefers FDI as the mode of inward investment because it brings more competition, the share of the JV o¤ered to the Southern …rm is negligible, and spillovers are not attractive (discourage innovation). Similar to the …rst region with low g's, interests here are in con ‡ict as the MNE prefers a JV whereas the Southern government favors FDI.
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Finally, it is never optimal for the South to fully protect IPRs allow a JV, which yields the entire bargaining power to the incoming MNE. This causes welfare to drop down to the W J ( N ; = 0) curve in all three regions.
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Proposition 6 The South never …nds it optimal to fully protect IPRs and concede all bargaining power in a JV to the Northern MNE. We demonstrated a precise set of conditions under which the JV will be established. When …rms form a JV and coordinate their production they gain from reduced competition but tend to help their rivals gain market share. This, the well-known merger paradox, implies in our context that without R&D investment the JV is unpro…table. We showed that the level of R&D intensity must be su¢ ciently high to overcome the combined loss of market share that occurs as a result of the JV. Lower R&D spillovers also work towards JVs and we showed that the threshold spillover, below which it is an equilibrium, increases in the R&D intensity of the Multinational up to a maximum and then declines. In addition to looking at the positive aspects of IPR protection we also employed our model to look at the e¤ects on welfare in the Southern country and considered possible policy responses of the Southern government. We found that when a JV is viable, the sum of southern …rms'pro…ts under a JV always exceed the corresponding levels under direct FDI. However this gain to …rms 32 comes at the expense of the consumer who faces higher prices under the JV.
We found that if the Northern …rm has all the bargaining power and IPRs are fully protected then a JV will be inferior to direct FDI from the point of view of Southern welfare. For a JV to dominate from a Southern welfare perspective we need some Southern bargaining power and/or imperfect IPR protection. We showed that for moderately R&D intensive industries the best possible policy is to set IPR protection at the level that will just induce a JV to occur. This result was shown to be independent of the bargaining power of the …rms. For highly R&D intensive industries Southern welfare under a JV can be higher with full IPR protection, but only if the Southern bargaining power in the JV is positive. In particular, we demonstrated that this is the case when the Southern …rm has all the bargaining power and the level of R&D e¤ectiveness is above a threshold level. We also showed that there is also a higher threshold level of the e¤ectiveness above which a JV always yields lower Southern welfare than direct FDI. 
NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
